The relevant sections of The Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 read as follows: (1) Subject as hereinafter in this sub-section provided, any person who, with intent to destroy the life of a child capable of being born alive, by any wilful act cause a child to die before it has an existence independent of its mother, shall be guilty of felony, to wit of child destruction and shall be liable on conviction thereof on indictment to penal servitude for life. Provided that no person shall be found guilty of an offence under this section unless it is proved that the act which caused the death of the child was not done in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother. (2) For the purposes of this act, evidence that a woman had at any material time been pregnant for a period of 28 weeks or more shall be prima facie proof that she was at that time pregnant of a child capable of being born alive.
Case law consists of several judgments over the last 30 years, the best known of which is R. v. Bourne(3) where Mr. Bourne, a well known gynaecological surgeon was charged with unlawfully terminating a pregnancy. The meaning of the word "unlawfully" in section 58 of the Act quoted is an important feature of these cases. In the Bourne case, the direction to the jury emphasised that the prosecution had the duty of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the operation of terminating the pregnancy was not performed in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the patient.
It is reasonable for the lay mind to assume from various judgments in the Courts that this question of good faith is of paramount importance. In some respects, it is unusual that none of the cases of criminal abortion with the ensuing judgments dealing with the aspect of good faith has found its way to the court of appeal. In one judgment, it was ruled by the judge that as far as the termination of pregnancy in good faith on medical grounds was concerned, the range of the danger to the life of the mother would not be examined too closely (R. v. Bergmann and Ferguson (4)). This question of good faith was dealt with in R. v. Newton and Stungo(5) by the judge, who held that a termination of pregnancy was unlawful unless carried out "in good faith for the purposes of preserving the life or health of the woman, and when I say health I mean not only her physical health but also her mental health". Statute law has no reference to this aspect of good faith. An interesting commentary in this connection is included in the Report of the Inter-departmental Committee on Abortion 1939(6). One of the recommendations was that "the law should be amended to make it unmistakably clear that a medical practitioner is acting legally when, in good faith, he procures the abortion of a pregnant woman in circumstances which satisfy him that continuance of the pregnancy is likely to endanger her life or seriously to impair her health". In fact this recommendation has not found its way into any statute.
The question of "good faith" was mentioned by the judge in the Bourne case. His ipsissima verba in his direction to the jury were "the question you have got to determine is whether the Crown has proved to your satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt that the act which Mr. Bourne admittedly did was not done in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the girl. If the Crown has failed to satisfy you of that, Mr. Bourne is entitled, by the law of the land, to a verdict of acquittal. On the other hand, if you are satisfied beyond all real doubt that Mr. Bourne did not do it in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the girl, your verdict should be a verdict of guilty". Several comments of the judge in the same case are pertinent and of value in relation to the law as it stands. For example, the point is made "where the doctor expects, basing his opinion upon the experience and knowledge of the profession, that the child cannot be delivered without the death of the mother." In these circumstances, the doctor is entitled -and indeed it is his duty-to perform the operation with a view to saving the life of the mother.
In view of what has been stated frequently in discussions on The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill(7), presently under consideration in the House of Commons, another observation of the learned judge is relevant, "some there may be, for all I know, who, hold the view that the fact that the woman desires the operation to be performed is a sufficient justification for it. That is not the law". He clarifies another point which is obviously one that is pertinent to the discussions on this new Bill, "on the other hand, no doubt there are people who, from what are said to be religious reasons object to the operation being performed at all, in any circumstances. That is not the law either".
At this point, it may help to state the views of the Roman Catholic Church. The equality of mother and foetus is an authoritative dogma of the Church, "the life of each is equally sacred", said Pope Pius XI in his encyclical Casti Connubii, "and no one has the power, not even the public authority, to destroy it".
Apart from these particular observations on the law, the judge in the case of R. v. Bourne gave a general outline in his judgment, "the law of this land has always held human life to be sacred, and the protection that the law gives to human life it extends also to the unborn child in the womb. The unborn child in the womb must not be destroyed unless the destruction of that child is for the purpose of preserving the yet more precious life of the mother". The observations of the learned judge clarify the existing law on the termination of pregnancy. It is evident that the law does allow for the termination of pregnancy in certain circumstances.
Danger to life represents a clear indication. But over and above this point, it is clear also that danger to health or impairment of health whether physical or mental through the evolution of case law, have come: to be regarded as lawful indications for the termination of pregnancy. The surgeon is not compelled to, wait until the patient is obviously about to die before he performs the operation, but it is clear that if he foresees impairment or danger to physical or mental health, he is entitled legally, acting in good faith, to perform the operation. Having regard to all these considerations, the question emerges as to whether any need arises to amend existing legislation in relation to the termination of pregnancy.
There would appear to be a weakness in existing legislation which apparently permits the operation of termination of pregnancy to be performed relatively frequently in one city in the United Kingdom, whereas, in another city in the same country, this operation is but rarely performed, and this would seem to be an aspect of the law which requires particular clarification. It is appreciated that factors other than the interpretation of the law may be involved, but it is obvious that these do not afford a complete explanation. It is felt that amending legislation, if such be passed, should allow at least for the conscientious beliefs and the good faith of the members of the medical profession. There are many gynaecological surgeons who, for a lifetime, have found that the present terms of the law have given them all the freedom necessary to pursue their professional activities according to the moral and ethical standards of the code of practice of their profession and who do not see any pressing need to reform the existing law.
In the city of Belfast during the year 1966, 25,000 patients were admitted to obstetric and gynaecological units and 12 cases of therapeutic abortion were performed. A report of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists states that "in National Health Service Hospitals, there were approximately 1,600 recorded therapeutic abortions performed in 1958, and 2,800 in 1962" (8) In any proposed new legislation, the definition of indications for the legal termination of pregnancy must surely be drafted with extreme care. There is the obvious danger on the one hand of opening the legal door too widely and so increasing present abuses, and on the other of framing the law too closely on the question of indications for such must be sufficiently flexible to keep in line with advancements in medical science. This view is shared by the British Medical Association("), the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists(8) and the Joint Committee of the Law Society and the British Academy of Forensic Sciences (12) .
The original clause 1 of the new Bill, in general, proposed to legalise termination of pregnancy in cases of physical or mental risk, abnormalities in the child, severe over-straining of the pregnant woman's capacity as a mother, pregnancy as a result of rape, and where the mother was defective or became pregnant under the age of 16 years.
Amendments during the Committee stage resulted in the following alterations: 1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if that practitioner and another registered practitioner are of the opinion formed in good faith.
(i) That the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life or injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or the future well being of herself and or the child or her other children. (ii) In determining whether or not there is such injury to health or well being an account may be taken of the patients total environment actual or reasonably foreseeable. This clause, if approved by Parliament, must be adequate, surely certainly and without doubt for almost any contingency in which therapeutic abortion is likely to be considered. It is obvious, however, that interpretation of certain words and phrases may give rise to difficulty. The amended clause retains that flexibility necessary for the medical practitioner to come to a correct conclusion, having regard to all factors involved and the ethos and good faith of the profession.
Further amendments to this clause are likely to be made before the Bill goes to the House of Lords.
An important consideration in applying the law to the realities of the situation must be the risks of termination, whatever method be employed. Every Even cursory examination of figures quoted should discourage those who wish to see the practice of therapeutic abortion extended.
The suggestion in the original Bill that termination of pregnancy should include as a legal indication "a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped" is one which should be resisted to the full. It may have been born out of the dreadful thalidomide tragedies, but while every sympathy must be felt for those children who have survived and for their parents, the reality of the situation is that the diagnosis of foetal abnormality is well-nigh impossible in early pregnancy and indeed some forms of mental disorder do not manifest themselves till the child is some months old. Is there any difference in principle between the suggested procedure and killing the child at birth because of its abnormality? Is there any real difference between this killing of a child and euthanasia, to which the Church and the medical profession continue to offer rightful and legitimate resistance? Any action which was immoral and illegal prior to the passing of a Parliamentary Bill, becomes legal after the Royal Assent, but surely it does not become moral with the passing of an Act.
There has been support for the termination of pregnancy in those cases where a mother has contracted rubella at an early stage of pregnancy. Hill (16) and other writers have shown a high incidence of the rubella syndrome in the foetus, the highest being a figure of 50 per cent. (17) . But a patient having suffered from rubella in early pregnancy might well consider that a 50 per cent. incidence of abnormality insufficient to provide her with grounds for termination of her pregnancy and many gynaecological surgeons would agree with her views.
Much has been written about the psychiatric indications for abortion. While there may be psychiatric reasons for this procedure, assessed on complete honesty, yet much less prominence has been given to the psychic sequelae which may follow termination of pregnancy. The summary given by Martin Ekblad(18) is interesting. "The psychically abnormal find it more difficult than the psychically normal to stand the stress implied in a legal abortion. This means that the greater the psychiatric indications for legal abortion are, the greater will be the risk of unfavourable psychic sequelae after the operation".
Another view is expressed by Robert White (19) . "An abortion induced under these circumstances, i.e. circumstances of a properly arranged abortion after adequate consideration, in an emotionally supportive setting and followed by enough adequate psychotherapeutic sessions to work through the resultant doubts and potential guilt probably does not cause serious psychological damage." He instances the opinions of writers in Denmark and America to support his view.
The decline in population in those countries where legalised abortion is practised seems to be due more to this than to the practice of contraception. Figures show that while the number of illegal abortions remains at the same level as formerly, yet the figure for full-time births has now fallen below that of legally procured abortion.
There can be no objection to incorporating in the new Bill a clause to demand the agreement of two or even more registered medical practitioners.
There is danger in a suggestion that legalised abortion should be carried out only by those surgeons employed in the National Health Service. This may not present itself favourably to the medical profession or to the General Medical Council which controls the admission of medical practitioners to the Medical Register. What is important is to ensure that there is a proviso in the Bill to the effect that the operation will be carried out by those with experience and skill.
If control of legalised abortion be required, the notification of each abortion and of the hospital or other institution where the operation was performed will meet the case. Difficulty may arise as to the confidentiality in the case of notification, but this aspect can be covered by a "doctor to doctor" procedure.
One additional danger implicit in the new Bill is the legal risk to the surgeon who refuses to perform the operation. There is a possibility, probably not in the near future, but nevertheless a distinct possibility, that he may by his refusal become legally culpable and, at least, may find himself in the position of having to defend his actions in the Courts. The Bill now incorporates a clause allowing for the conscientious views of those, who hold that therapeutic abortion is wrong, from either a moral or religious point of view, yet it is possible that a medical practitioner may be debarred for this reason, from obtaining or holding a consultant post in the National Health Service. It is to be hoped sincerely that discrimination of this sort will never be permitted.
Must we not hold to the ethos of medicine, in simple language to save life and certainly not to destroy it? The sanctity of life is paramount.
It is pertinent to recall the views of Doctor F. M. R. Walshe (20) on A.I.D. and these are "when techniques come into the irresponsible hands of the ethically rootless, they are a constant threat to both intellectual and ethical values, as we may see when we gaze around us upon a world in which man is torn and tormented by the fruits of techniques he has neither the wisdom nor the sense of values to control. Medicine now is being invaded by this evil, and every thoughtful doctor, who holds dear the traditions of medicine as a humane and learned profession must feel called upon to protest in unequivocal language".
These comments should receive the most careful and searching consideration in the drafting and the examination of the final approval of any Bill relating to the therapeutic termination of pregnancy.
